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## CSO Engagement to Deliver the Agenda 2030 Anti-Corruption Targets: The Case for a Supranational Initiative

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[“Supranational Responses to Corruption”](#)

### Abstract:

Hundreds of millions of people have to pay bribes when using public services. This situation has not improved for more than a decade. There is a strong case for rethinking the current anti-corruption approaches in which funding for anti-corruption and good governance programs is overwhelmingly allocated to government efforts (supply side) with relatively little given to non-state actors (demand side).

Increasingly evidence has grown that civil society can make a meaningful difference in the furtherance of anti-corruption aims. By virtue of their ability to act independently of governments and reach local communities directly, they have helped reduce bribery in delivery of public services as called for in Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals.

There is widespread understanding of the benefits of engaging civil society to fight corruption as reflected in policy statements by almost all major anti-corruption groups. However, PTF’s research concluded that there remains no cohesive supranational approach to CSO-led anti-corruption initiatives focused on targeting bribery and corruption in public service delivery. This is largely due to a lack of resources for CSOs to engage in anti-corruption activities and reluctance on the part of national governments to allow adequate civic space for such CSO engagement.

Against the backdrop of COVID-19 and an ongoing need for widespread social support, civil society engagement could have an outsized impact on effective public service delivery. Through advocacy efforts, monitoring of resources, and grassroots organizing, CSOs could play a crucial role in corruption free delivery of public services. Moreover, due to their proximity to and familiarity with local communities, they can also focus efforts on the eradication of bribery as called for in SDG Targets 16.5 to 16.7.

With this context in mind, the paper below proposes a supranational initiative to make a difference in the lives of hundreds of millions of people, particularly who have to pay bribes when using public services. An effective global approach to civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts would involve the provision of funding for eligible organizations in low- and middle-income countries, enabling them to engage in activities for corruption free delivery of public services. For fast and sizable impact, the Initiative should be designed to work with the existing International Financial Institutions funded projects to expand delivery of a wide range of public services. In consideration of the evidence and understanding that government cannot effectively eradicate corruption on its own, the timing is right for this initiative. The organization of a supranational approach to civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts, particularly in public service delivery, will ultimately further the achievement of global development goals through a whole-of-society approach to anti-corruption.

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
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This paper calls for a **supranational initiative** during this [Decade of Action](#) to scale up CSO engagement to help United Nations (UN) members deliver on the global goal of substantially reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms ([SDG Target 16.5](#)) and to increase transparency and participation in public institutions ([SDG Targets 16.6 and 16.7](#)).

**Transformative action is needed to help the hundreds of millions of people around the world who have to pay a bribe when using public services.** Inclusion of anti-corruption targets in the Agenda 2030 was a breakthrough driven by public anger about widespread corruption around the world. However, progress in delivering on these goals in the first five years of Agenda 2030 has been disappointing. According to Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Reports,<sup>i</sup> the number of such people increased from one in ten in 2009 to one in four in 2017, and 57 percent said their government is not fighting corruption effectively and key government institutions are corrupt. People are not only losing faith but also losing hope. Further, 68 percent of respondents in a survey to commemorate the United Nation’s seventy-fifth anniversary expressed their belief that government corruption will not get better by 2045.<sup>ii</sup> These data support the case for rethinking the current anti-corruption approaches in which funding for anti-corruption and good governance programs is overwhelmingly allocated to government efforts (supply side) with relatively little given to non-state actors (demand side).

**Increasingly, evidence has shown that proactive civil society organization (CSO) anti-corruption efforts to supplement government actions can make a positive difference.** The Partnership for Transparency reviewed more than 30 research and evaluation studies<sup>iii</sup> on anti-corruption and social accountability to collect data demonstrating that CSO engagement can measurably reduce corruption, increase public participation to improve development effectiveness, and increase government transparency and accountability. These findings are

*Figure 1: ANTI-CORRUPTION INTERVENTIONS: Summary of Evidence Base – Source: Study for former DFID, UK accessed at [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf) (page 84). [Emphasis Added].*



illustrated in Figure 1 which shows the relative effectiveness of typical anti-corruption interventions, based on evidence. It indicates that demand-side interventions by non-state actors (bold font) compare relatively well with the supply-side interventions by the state.<sup>iv</sup> The proposed supranational initiative to expand the civil society-led demand side of anti-corruption and governance interventions could be one of the bold and transformative actions needed for breakthrough progress. Increased civic engagement would accelerate progress towards SDG16 and improve the effectiveness of many ongoing anti-corruption initiatives.

**Governments and development partners have increasingly called for state and civil society actors to work together to reduce corruption.** CSOs would complement government efforts by engendering greater citizen uptake, better feedback to duty-bearers, and independent oversight. Consider this compilation of views expressed by key development players:

- The Special Session of the UN General Assembly held from 2-4 June 2021 declared: *“We note that no country is free of corruption and that, overall, while progress in preventing and combating corruption has been made, those efforts are not enough, and we commit to doing more to address remaining gaps and existing and emerging challenges and difficulties, in particular in the implementation of the [UNCAC].”*<sup>v</sup> Article 13 of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) mandates states to ensure participation of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the prevention of and the fight against corruption.<sup>vi</sup> The role of civil society in fighting corruption was mentioned by 45 of 115 national statements at the 2021 UN General Assembly.
- In its report on Anti-corruption Initiatives, the World Bank noted: *“For all environments, active and robust engagement with civil society can ensure that reform momentum continues in the right direction.”*<sup>vii</sup> In 2014, the World Bank Group adopted a strategy to mainstream citizen engagement in all its operations and has made good progress in implementing it.<sup>viii</sup>
- The International Monetary Fund (IMF), noted that *“non-governmental organizations and other CSOs play a growing role in publicizing issues of corruption; driving good governance, accountability, and transparency initiatives; and assisting in garnering political will and monitoring aid spending.”*<sup>ix</sup>
- In July 2021, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted a framework to enable development assistance providers to support civil society in development and humanitarian work. An OECD survey of 50 countries found that *“governments around the world recognize [the] need to involve citizens in policy making and in service design and provision as a means for better delivering an increasingly broad range of issues,”* and new and innovative forms of citizen participation are emerging across the world.<sup>x</sup>
- The G20 stated in its 2021 Rome Leaders Declaration: *“Renewing our commitment to zero tolerance for corruption in the public and private sectors and to achieving common goals in the global fight against corruption, we adopt our 2022-2024 Anti-Corruption Action Plan. We will further strengthen our engagement with other stakeholders such as academia, civil society, media and the private sector, and will continue to promote their important role and active participation in this field.”* The Action Plan calls for further strengthening of stakeholder engagement, including with CSOs.<sup>xi</sup>
- The 2021 Global Summit of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) (which included 78 countries and 76 local jurisdictions) reviewed ten years of its operations and reported that its model has produced more open governments, better policies, and improvements in people’s lives. Under the OGP model, civil society and governments co-create and implement two-year action plans for open government with concrete, ambitious commitments.<sup>xii</sup>

- In its 2021 Strategy on Countering Corruption,<sup>xiii</sup> the United States outlined a dedicated Strategic Objective (3.5) to *“bolster the ability of civil society, media, and private sector actors to safely detect and expose corruption, increase public awareness, and pursue accountability.”*
- Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022<sup>xiv</sup> notes: *“Real progress against corruption requires collective international action. As a core part of our diplomatic and development engagement we will encourage and support anti-corruption efforts by international partners in government, civil society, and the private sector.”*
- A coalition of CSOs from around the world—The Transparency, Accountability and Participation ([TAP](#)) Network—published a Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+ that urged *“governments to actively partner and collaborate closely with and support civil society and other non-state actors, for only an integrated and holistic approach can achieve sustainable peace, development and recovery from this multifaceted, COVID-19 pandemic.”*<sup>xv</sup>

**Realities constrain the aspirations for governments and civil society to work together to fight corruption.** Civil society, as a sector, has grown worldwide in size, skills, presence, and influence and is well poised to make a substantive contribution.<sup>xvi</sup> However, it is constrained from doing so due to 1) the lack of suitable resources and funding to enable it to hold the state accountable and confront corruption; and 2) the governments’ ambivalence, if not opposition, to allowing civil society to hold the state accountable. Major funding concerns are especially present in countries where governments restrict foreign funding. Also, civil society in lower- and middle-income countries lack institutions and traditions of strong domestic funding for CSOs, especially for governance and transparency work. Domestic philanthropy remains largely focused on traditional charitable activities. The proposed supranational initiative would help fill the gap and help build capacity in the developing countries.

**There are many international initiatives to fight corruption, but none of them is dedicated to funding and scaling CSO-led anti-corruption initiatives targeting bribery in public services.** The IMF has prepared a compendium of major anti-corruption Initiatives of 24 key international organizations and multilateral institutions.<sup>xvii</sup> In addition, there are many multistakeholder initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), CoST, Financial Transparency Coalition, Global Compact, Global Infrastructure Anticorruption Center, etc. A review of the objectives of these initiatives reveals that some of them provide grants to governments and CSOs while others focus on policies. Corruption in public services is included in the scope of these initiatives, along with other forms of bribery and corruption. However, there is no supranational initiative dedicated to funding CSOs on a large scale to confront corruption in the delivery of public services. The Global Partnership for Social Accountability ([GPSA](#)) is a multistakeholder initiative dedicated to funding CSOs but has operated at a modest scale over the past five years (averaging about \$4 million per year). In addition, bilateral donors (e.g., UK, USA, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the European Union) have programs to fund CSO activities that include anti-corruption from time to time.

**Against this backdrop, this paper proposes a supranational initiative for strategically expanding the engagement of grassroots CSOs to fight corruption in public service delivery.** The focus on public services is deliberate as this is one area where bribery remains commonplace, and a supranational

initiative could make a noticeable difference in the lives of hundreds of millions of people affected by this debilitating experience. As mentioned earlier, 1 in 4 people surveyed by Transparency International in 2017 said they paid a bribe when using public services in the 12 months prior to survey. In his 2021 Report on Progress in SDGs, UN Secretary General António Guterres noted that data from more than 120 countries and territories indicate that 37.6 percent people living in low-income countries and territories, numbering hundreds of millions, deal with bribery.<sup>xviii</sup> The delivery of public services is also financed by hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of projects funded by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs),<sup>xix</sup> meaning corruption affects them as well. There are serious concerns about corruption in the delivery of health, social protection, and cash assistance due to the trillions of dollars allocated, but yet to be spent for COVID-19 relief and recovery programs.

**The objective of the proposed initiative will be to expand grassroots CSO engagement to reduce bribery in the delivery of public services in lower- and middle-income countries.** At the moment there is no supranational initiative to specifically address this major and commonplace manifestation of corruption. However, creating such an initiative will supplement national government efforts. It will fill a major gap in funding for CSO-led activities to generate demand-side pressures, promote social accountability, and constructively engage with authorities to reduce bribery in public services delivery. It will also help develop the capacity of local CSOs to work with governments to fight corruption, accelerate progress in SDG16 anti-corruption targets, and contribute to corruption-free delivery of services in practically all SDGs: education, health, water and sanitation, transport, agriculture, community development, climate change, natural resource management, social protection, nutrition, electricity, and disaster relief. The success will be measured by: (a) number of beneficiaries of the program; and (b) percentage change in the proportion of persons who paid or were asked for a bribe by a public official after the intervention compared to the baseline in the covered area and service (patterned after the SDG Indicator: 16.5.1). Similar to other supranational initiatives, funding and leadership will be needed from private philanthropists, foundations, bilateral donors, and IFIs.

**This is a good strategic time to launch such an initiative for the following reasons:**

- Widespread recognition that governments alone will not be able to deliver progress on SDG16 targets has led to growing calls for government and civil society to work together to fight corruption, as noted earlier in the paper.
- There is a substantial amount of evidence that CSO engagement can reduce corruption.<sup>xx</sup> This has led IFIs to adopt policies to support and fund citizen, stakeholder, and CSO engagement in the projects they fund, and all anti-corruption summits and conventions call for CSO engagement. However, the space and opportunity created by these avenues remain vastly underused.
- Many governments are committed to welcoming civil society engagement. For example, 79 member nations of the Open Government Partnership are committed to joint government-CSO efforts. Further, 52 nations have [opted in](#) to the GPSA, confirming that CSOs are eligible to receive funding and capacity building support from GPSA for social accountability work in their respective countries. All donors and recipients of International Development Association ([IDA](#)), the world's premier funding facility for lower-income countries, have

- pledged to support citizen, beneficiary, and CSO engagement in the development programs and policies funded by IDA.
- Despite the Agenda 2030 call for governments and civil society to work together, in reality civil society faces growing barriers and significant funding constraints, hindering efforts to hold national governments accountable. It is unrealistic to expect civil society in developing countries to mobilize sufficient funding from domestic sources. This is a particularly acute problem in places where its effective participation is most needed i.e., lower- and middle-income countries with endemic corruption.
  - Civil society needs help in order to continue contributing to and participating in anti-corruption efforts. The Rome Declaration by the members of the [TAP Network](#) has called for the creation of an “SDG16+ Challenge Fund” to help support CSOs at the grassroots level to advance the ambitions of SDG16.<sup>xxi</sup> The OGP Civil Society Steering Committee<sup>xxii</sup> has called for the establishment of a CSO window under IDA20 to support independent monitoring by CSOs of the full lifecycle of IDA-funded projects to ensure that money is not wasted.

**Design work for such an initiative should be based on co-creation principles and pursued in a consultation with all key stakeholders.** These include governments, CSOs, philanthropic foundations, multistakeholder initiatives, donors, and international organizations. The following principles are offered, without implying order of importance, to start the conversation:

1. The proposed initiative will supplement, rather than substitute, government and donor efforts to engage CSOs in governance and anti-corruption work. It will aim to serve as a deterrent and catalytic force rather than to catch every instance of bribery. To this end, it will provide long-term funding of programs designed to strengthen local grassroots CSO capacities for demanding transparency and holding perpetrators accountable.
2. It will engage with IFIs to help improve implementation of their policies and programs for CSO engagement in projects and programs they support. It will advocate and monitor IFI guidelines, monitoring and evaluation systems, and data disclosure to ensure that they are effectively implemented and CSO engagement takes place on the ground.
3. Funding for the initiative should be raised from private philanthropy organizations, international NGOs (INGOs), and bilateral and multilateral official donors. There are many models for such partnerships that can help design this initiative.
4. Local CSOs in lower- and middle-income countries would be eligible for grants within the initiative, with a particular emphasis on those that have supportive contexts for CSO-led anti-corruption, particularly at the local level. Where possible, conflict-affected and fragile contexts will be prioritized. Recipient CSOs may include international CSOs in their proposal for advisory and/or capacity building roles.
5. Constructive engagement<sup>xxiii</sup> with duty bearers will be required at all stages of the projects.
6. Programmatic funding will be provided for both operations and capacity building. This is needed to ensure core, ongoing, and sustained financial support for CSO engagement.

7. Eligible activities may include advocacy, community engagement, anti-corruption operational activities, and capacity building, among others.
8. CSOs would follow evidence-based approaches in designing and implementing their programs for maximum effectiveness.
9. The goal is to mobilize and support a large number of CSOs in participating countries to create momentum. This will require national or regional programs that would provide small grants to a large number of CSOs. Program/Grant managers should preferably be local with possibility of support from international managers with transition arrangements depending on country and program contexts. This approach will work to build country systems.
10. Participating CSOs will work in cooperation and collaboration with state institutions to ensure government accountability e.g., supreme audit and anti-corruption institutions.

**For a quick start and early impact, the initiative may begin in collaboration with the key IFIs** such as: the World Bank, IMF, and the regional development banks including: Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This approach has many advantages:

- It provides opportunities to advocate for the maximum use and funding of CSOs in helping design, implement, monitor, and evaluate hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of project investments in developing countries.
- Using the IFI convening power and access to government enhances advocacy efforts to call for the preservation and expansion of civic space.
- Using extensive IFI infrastructure in developing countries facilitates channeling funds for, and supervising the use of civil society engagement (CSE) over the full project life cycle.
- It provides an avenue to channel funds to CSOs in fragile, conflict-affected, and violent situations (FCV), as well as other situations which create restrictions on foreign funds flowing to local CSOs.
- It creates potential for IFIs to nudge governments to open up space for civic engagement through their policy advice and prior actions for policy-based lending.

**IFIs already support CSO engagement in the projects and programs they fund, and the initiative will supplement this work and hold IFIs accountable for delivering on their promises.** Collaboration would be in line with their corporate strategies and operational policies that include commitments and performance indicators to help member countries improve governance and fight corruption.<sup>xxiv</sup> Though they do not have the funds to finance CSO-led demand-side interventions, IFIs are funding governments to implement the following types of interventions to improve public service delivery:

- Providing access to information and raising citizen awareness of rights and responsibilities
- Building the capacity of citizens, CSOs, and government agencies to work constructively together
- Requiring stakeholder engagement at all stages of project cycle

- Training citizens to use third-party monitoring tools such as community score cards and citizen report cards
- Facilitating grievance redress and building feedback loops for citizens to report shortcomings and discuss remedies
- Monitoring public procurement and delivery of goods, services, and infrastructure at the local level such as school and health facility construction, textbooks, pharmaceuticals, and social protection supplies
- Participating in local budget formulation, decision-making, and expenditure monitoring

**IFIs can collaborate with this initiative in many ways, including building on their commendable policies for engaging with CSOs** such as participation, citizen engagement, stakeholder engagement, collaboration with CSOs, access to information, safeguards, and social inclusion. Building on these, IFIs can commit to:

- Identify elements in the anti-corruption plans for IFI-funded public service delivery investment projects and budget support programs that might best be implemented by, or in partnership with, CSOs and ensure that explicit provisions are made for funding and contracting such CSO engagement.
- Expand support for capacity building on civic engagement for both CSOs and government officials, and track and report key data on such support.
- Use dialogue with recipient governments to enable CSO engagement in design and implementation of corruption-free public service delivery policies and programs.
- Make changes in financing facilities and business processes that would make it easier to contract CSOs.
- Expand the practice of including prior actions in budget support (development policy) lending and results-based lending to open up CSO engagement and civic space.
- Establish a system to monitor and report the number of CSOs funded, and the amount of funding allocated/awarded for CSO contracts.
- Assess country policies and systems for CSO engagement, and proactively use their policy dialogues with member country governments to argue for providing a more enabling policy and legislative environment that will support more effective operationalization of IFI policies on stakeholder/CSO engagement and beneficiary participation.

**In the start-up phase the proposed supranational initiative would supplement IFI work in two important ways.**

First, it would provide funding to CSOs to independently monitor and advocate progress in engagement and impact of CSOs in IFI-funded public services operations.

Second, it would provide medium to long-term funding for national programs involving grassroots CSOs to carry out additional (to IFI-funded) activities (direct action, monitoring, and advocacy) for corruption-free delivery of services and to build CSO capacity for carrying out such activities.



## Summary of conclusions and recommendations

**The value added by civil society in affecting change through grassroots initiatives has been well documented, and this approach should be applied to global efforts to combat corruption.** By actively engaging civil society in anti-corruption efforts, governments will be able to leverage their proximity to and knowledge of local communities to optimize public service delivery. Further, CSOs unique position and approach enables them to serve as effective monitors of the allocation of public funds, ensuring optimization of resources and funds allocated to services.

**Despite the undeniable benefits of civil society engagement, there is no supranational plan to incorporate CSOs in anti-corruption work in any meaningful way.** The initiative proposed in this paper outlines an approach to CSE which ensures civil society can supplement existing government efforts and further progress toward achieving SDG 16 by closing the service delivery gap. Specifically, this initiative would focus on CSO monitoring of public service delivery in order to target and eradicate the ongoing and widespread challenge of officials who demand bribes.

**Governments alone will not be able to deliver on Agenda 2030 goals, but CSOs can help.** For fast results the Initiative could begin with IFIs supported programs for expansion of public services. Incorporating civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts is a first, meaningful, and necessary step toward a fully whole-of-society approach to countering corruption and making progress in SDG Targets for reducing corruption, increasing transparency and accountability.

As of 21<sup>st</sup> January 2022

<sup>i</sup> See Pages 4-5 of *People and Corruption: Citizen's Voices from Around the World*, Transparency International 2017, at <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/people-and-corruption-citizens-voices-from-around-the-world>

<sup>ii</sup> See Pages 66-67 of *United Nations (September 2020). The Future We Want. The United Nations We Need*. Accessed 13 August 2021 at [https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un75report\\_september\\_final\\_english.pdf](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un75report_september_final_english.pdf)

<sup>iii</sup> See Chapter 3 of *Expanding Civil Society Contributions to the Governance Agendas of the Sustainable Development Goals and International Financial Institutions*. The curated list of studies is in Annex 1 of the report. Partnership for Transparency. Accessed at: [www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf](http://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf)

<sup>iv</sup> See of evidence on what works in anti-corruption interventions in the report "*Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects and How to Address Them*" produced for UK government in 2015. Accessed at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf)

<sup>v</sup> United Nations. *Political Declaration at UN General Assembly Thirty Second Special Session on Corruption*, Page 4, Resolution A/Res/S/S-32/1. 2 June 2021. Accessed at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/138/82/PDF/N2113882.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>vi</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/>

<sup>vii</sup> *Anticorruption Initiative: Reaffirming Commitment to a Development Priority (English)*. Figure 4 and Page 28. The World Bank 2020. Washington, D.C.: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/365421591933442799/Anticorruption-Initiatives-Reaffirming-Commitment-to-a-Development-Priority>

<sup>viii</sup> Also review the IEG evaluation of the Framework. 2017. Access at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/752861493760420695/engaging-citizens-for-better-development-results-an-ieg-evaluation-of-world-bank-group-citizen-engagement> .

<sup>ix</sup> *Role of Fund in Governance Issues. Background Notes. Page 24.* <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/08/01/pp080217-background-notes-the-role-of-the-fund-in-governance-issues-review-of-the-guidance-note>

<sup>x</sup> OECD DAC recommendation on "*Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance*" 5<sup>th</sup> July 2021. Accessed at <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5021> and Executive Summary page 18 of *Open Government: The Global Context and the Way Forward*. 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.oecd.org/publications/open-government-9789264268104-en.htm>

<sup>xi</sup> G20 Rome Leaders Declaration and 2022-2024 Action Plan accessed at <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/g20-anti-corruption-resources/by-thematic-area.html>

<sup>xii</sup> OGP at Ten: Toward Democratic Renewal accessed at <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/ogp-at-ten-toward-democratic-renewal/#where>

<sup>xiii</sup> *United States Strategy on Countering Corruption*. Accessed at [www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Strategy-on-Countering-Corruption.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Strategy-on-Countering-Corruption.pdf)

<sup>xiv</sup> UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022. Accessed at:

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/667221/6\\_3\\_323\\_Anti-Corruption\\_Strategy\\_WEB.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/667221/6_3_323_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf)

<sup>xv</sup> See the 2021 Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+, titled “[A Renewed Call for Strengthening Commitments, Partnerships, and Accelerated Action for SDG16+](https://tapnetwork2030.org/romedeclaration/),” accessed at <https://tapnetwork2030.org/romedeclaration/>

<sup>xvi</sup> See *Civil Society and Development: Global Trends, Implications and recommendations for Stakeholders in the 2030 Agenda*. Partnership for Transparency. Accessed at: [https://www.ptfund.org/publication\\_page/civil-society-development-global-trends-implications-and-recommendations-for-stakeholders-in-the-2030-agenda/](https://www.ptfund.org/publication_page/civil-society-development-global-trends-implications-and-recommendations-for-stakeholders-in-the-2030-agenda/)

<sup>xvii</sup> Annex 1 of Note II: Compendium of Key Initiatives attached to IMF Background Notes on the Role of Fund in Governance Issues. Background Notes. Page 24. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/08/01/pp080217-background-notes-the-role-of-the-fund-in-governance-issues-review-of-the-guidance-note>. The anti-corruption initiatives of the following institutions are briefly described: UNODC; UNDP; SDGs; the World Bank Group; OECD; Financial Action Task Force; G20; The Commonwealth Secretariat; Regional Institutions and Organizations (The African Union, African Development Bank, Southern African Development Community, Asian Development Bank, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The Council of Europe, The European Union, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Organization of American States, Interamerican Development Bank, Anti-corruption Summit; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Open Government Partnership.

<sup>xviii</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council (E/2021/58) *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General*, Para 173. Accessed at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/109/71/PDF/N2110971.pdf?OpenElement>. Also see SDG16+ Progress Report 2019 by Institute for Economics and Peace accessed at <https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SDG16Progress-Report-2019-web.pdf>

<sup>xix</sup> The key IFIs include the World Bank Group, The International Monetary Fund, The Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and European Investment Bank (EIB).

<sup>xx</sup> See Chapter 3 of *Expanding Civil Society Contributions to the Governance Agendas of the Sustainable Development Goals and International Financial Institutions*. Partnership for Transparency. Accessed at: [www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf](http://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf)

<sup>xxi</sup> See recommendations under para 28 and 32 of the 2019 Rome Declaration on SDG16+and its 2021 update , both endorsed by CSOs from the world [https://tapnetwork2030.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Rome-Civil-Society-Declaration-on-SDG16\\_Compilation.pdf](https://tapnetwork2030.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Rome-Civil-Society-Declaration-on-SDG16_Compilation.pdf)

<sup>xxii</sup> See <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/news/statement-of-the-ogp-civil-society-steering-committee-in-support-of-a-civil-society-window-in-the-world-banks-ida-20-replenishment/>

<sup>xxiii</sup> <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/constructive-engagement-processes-between-governments-and-csos-in-asia-are-we-getting-results/>

<sup>xxiv</sup> See Annex III of *Expanding Civil Society Contributions to the Governance Agendas of the Sustainable Development Goals and International Financial Institutions*. Partnership for Transparency. Accessed at: [www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf](http://www.ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Civil-Society-Contributions-to-Good-Governance.pdf)